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HE laws of states and nations collide when foreign factors appear
in a lawsuit. Nonresident litigants, incidents outside the forum,
parallel lawsuits, and judgments from other jurisdictions can cre-
ate problems with personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recogni-
tion of foreign judgments. This Article reviews Texas conflict cases from
Texas state and federal courts during the Survey period from November
1, 2009 through September 30, 2010. The Article excludes cases involving
federal-state conflicts; intrastate issues such as subject matter jurisdiction
and venue; and conflicts in time such as the applicability of prior or sub-
sequent law within a state. State and federal cases are discussed together
because conflict of laws is mostly a state-law topic, except for a few con-
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stitutional limits, resulting in similar rules applying to most issues in state
and federal courts.'
Although no data is readily available to confirm this, Texas is no doubt
a primary state in the production of conflict-of-laws precedents. This re-
sults not only from its size and population, but also from its placement
bordering four states as well as a civil law nation (Mexico), and its in-
volvement in international shipping. Only California shares these factors,
with the partial exception of states bordering Quebec. Texas courts expe-
rience every range of conflict-of-laws litigation. In addition to a large
number of garden-variety opinions on personal jurisdiction, Texas courts
produce case law every year on Internet-based jurisdiction, prorogating
and derogating forum-selection clauses, federal long-arm statutes with
nationwide process, international forum non conveniens, parallel litiga-
tion, international family law issues, and private lawsuits against foreign
sovereigns. Recognition and enforcement of interstate and international
judgments offer fewer annual examples, possibly a sign of that subject's
administrative nature resulting in only a few reported cases.
Texas state and federal courts provide a fascinating study of conflicts
issues every year, but the volume of case law now greatly exceeds this
Survey's ability to report on them. Thus, this article focuses on selective
cases due to journal space and author's time.
I. FORUM CONTESTS
Asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant requires amenabil-
ity to Texas jurisdiction and receipt of proper notice. Amenability may
be established by consent (usually based on a contract's forum-selection
clause), waiver (failure to make a timely objection), or extraterritorial
service of process under a Texas long-arm statute. Because most aspects
of notice are purely matters of forum law, this Article focuses primarily
on issues relating to amenability.
Oddly, this Survey period produced no significant cases on routine
minimum contacts analyses, but three on internet jurisdiction, an unusual
case on a will contest, a worthwhile discussion of federal long-arm stat-
utes, and heavy Texas Supreme Court emphasis on enforcing both dero-
gating forum-selection clauses (those pointing to another jurisdiction)
and forum non conveniens challenges.
A. CONSENT AND WAIVER
Contracting parties may agree to a forum-selection clause designating
the optional or exclusive site for litigation or arbitration. When a con-
tracting party sues in a designated forum, the clause is said to be a proro-
gation clause because it supports the forum's jurisdiction over the
1. For a thorough discussion of the federal law's role in choice-of-law questions, see
RUSSELL WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CoNFLIcr OF LAWS 649-95 (4th ed. 2001).
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defendant.2 When a contracting party sues in a nonselected forum in vio-
lation of the contract, the clause is said to be a derogation clause, because
it undermines the forum's jurisdiction.3 Because derogation clauses at-
tack rather than establish jurisdiction, it is discussed in the section on
Declining Jurisdiction. 4
Prorogation clauses tend to be routine because they establish the fo-
rum's jurisdiction. RSR Corp. v. Siegmund5 stood out as a contrary ex-
ample by presenting two forum clauses, one designating Texas and the
other Chile. RSR Corp. involved a dispute between metal refinery com-
panies. In 2003, Dallas-based RSR executed an agreement with Inp-
pamet, a Chilean corporation, in which RSR would provide training and
technical assistance to Inppamet during its production of anodes used in
metal refining. That agreement included a confidentiality clause, *other
restrictive covenants, and a permissive "consent-to-jurisdiction" clause
providing that "any action or proceeding arising out of or relating to this
Agreement . . . may be heard" by a state or federal court in Dallas,
Texas.6 In 2007, pursuant to the parties' discussion of Inppamet's acquisi-
tion by RSR or one of its subsidiaries, they entered two confidentiality
agreements, known collectively as "the 2007 Agreements," to allow for
due-diligence exchange of information. Unlike the 2003 Agreement,
which was limited to RSR and Inppamet, the 2007 Agreements included
subsidiaries or affiliates of both RSR and Inppamet. More importantly,
the 2007 Agreements provided an exclusive forum clause designating
Santiago, Chile.7
The contemplated acquisitions never occurred in 2008. RSR and its
subsidiary Quemetco sued Inppamet and related parties for breach of the
2003 Agreement, fraud, theft, and other business torts. Defendants
moved to dismiss based on the 2007 Agreements' Chilean forum clause.
The trial court upheld the 2007 forum clause and dismissed the case. 8 The
Dallas Court of Appeals reversed. In careful analysis of competing fo-
rum clauses, the court held plaintiffs' claims arose under the 2003 Agree-
ment's covenants and did not relate to the 2007 Agreements' purpose of
corporate acquisition. 9 The court agreed with defendants' argument that
artful pleading could not circumvent an otherwise binding forum clause,
but found plaintiffs' claims were legitimately tied to the 2003 obligations
and were not attempts to sue on the 2007 obligations. 10 To reach this
conclusion, the court used the "common-sense examination" standard
2. EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 361 (2d ed. 1992).
3. Id.
4. James P. George, Parallel Litigation, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 769, 813-49 (1999); see
SCOLES & HAY, supra note 1, at 360-61. For a discussion of forum derogation clauses, see
infra Part I.D.1.
5. 309 S.W.3d 686 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.).
6. Id. at 694.
7. Id. at 694-95.
8. Id. at 695-97.
9. Id. at 700-05.
10. Id. at 703-04.
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and placed a restrictive reading on the forum clause derogating Texas
jurisdiction." This contrasts, but does not necessarily conflicts with, the
Texas Supreme Court's use of the same common-sense standard, during
the Survey period to provide expansive readings of foreign forum
clauses.12
B. TEXAS LONG-ARM AND MINIMUM CONTACTS
Texas uses "limits-of-due-process" long-arm statutes, meaning the min-
imum contacts test is the only necessary foundation for personal jurisdic-
tion in Texas. 13 These long-arm statutes also apply in Texas federal courts,
except where Congress enacted a federal long-arm statute for certain fed-
eral law claims. 14
1. Internet-Based Jurisdiction
A number of American jurisdictions, including Texas and the Fifth Cir-
cuit, apply the Zippo sliding scale to assess personal jurisdiction based on
Internet contacts. I5 The test breaks down Internet use into a spectrum of
three areas. One end of the spectrum finds a defendant clearly doing
business in a forum based on the defendant's contracts with forum re-
sidents; the spectrum's other end involves passive websites and the defen-
dant's unintentional contact with a forum, leading to a lack of
jurisdiction.16 The spectrum's difficult middle involves a forum resident's
exchange of information with defendant's host computer, and jurisdiction
is based on the level of interactivity and the commercial nature of the
information exchanged. 17 The Survey period produced a number of per-
sonal jurisdiction opinions in which courts considered internet-based con-
tacts. This Article highlights three noteworthy cases that adeptly analyze
the gray areas of the Zippo and Mink tests.
11. Id. at 700, 704.
12. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
13. See U-Anchor Adver., Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977). The primary
Texas long-arm statutes are found at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-.045
(West 2008), and others are scattered throughout Texas statutes. See, e.g., TEX. AGRIC.
CODE ANN. § 161.132 (West 2004) (violation of certain agricultural statutes); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 6.305 (West 2006) (nonresident respondents in divorce actions); TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. § 823.457 (West 2009) (violations of duties imposed on insurance holding
companies).
14. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (state long-arms in federal court); FED. R. Civ. P.
4(k)(1)(C) (federal long-arm statutes). Examples of federal long-arm statutes include 28
U.S.C. § 2361 (2006) for statutory interpleader and 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006) for claims
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
15. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
1997). The Fifth Circuit adopted the Zippo test in Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d
333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999). Repetitive Texas appellate courts have used it as well. See, e.g.,
Townsend v. Univ. Hosp.-Univ. of Colo., 83 S.W.3d 913, 922 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002,
pet. denied); Experimental Aircraft Ass'n v. Doctor, 76 S.W.3d 496, 506-07 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2002), remanded sub noma., Doctor v. Pardue, 186 S.W.3d 4 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).




Jackson v. Hoffman considers a grey area of website advertising, hold-
ing that a non-resident service provider's website and subsequent email
correspondence is an insufficient jurisdictional contact. 18 Jackson, a Dal-
las resident, wanted his 1969 Camaro restored and found Hoffman's Mis-
souri-based restoration service through a "Google" search. After
negotiating by email, Jackson had Hoffman retrieve his car from another
shop in Missouri. 19 When Hoffman's invoices exceeded initial price esti-
mates and the Camaro was only eighty percent restored, communications
broke down and Jackson sued in a Texas state court in Dallas.20 The
parties agreed Hoffman's contacts did not give rise to general jurisdiction
and his website was the only Texas contact regarding Jackson's claim.21
The court noted the only interactive quality of Hoffman's website was
contact information, and despite the emails flowing from that, this was
passive activity that did not rise to purposeful availment.22
The facts in Kelly Law Firm, P.C. v. An Attorney for You illustrates the
other end of website solicitation, although still within a gray area.23 Kelly
Law Firm is a Houston-based personal injury firm. Calliope Media L.P.
(d.b.a. An Attorney for You) is a California internet marketing service
that provides leads on clients with mesothelioma or birth defects.24 Calli-
ope contracted with Kelly to refer potential mesothelioma and birth in-
jury plaintiffs from its websites in exchange for payment.25 Kelly found
the leads insufficient and sued Calliope in Texas.26 Plaintiff Kelly offered
two evidentiary bases to establish Texas long-arm contacts-screen shots
of Calliope's website targeting potential legal clients for "attorneys in the
state of Texas" and contractual language requiring Calliope to collect in-
formation from potential Texas clients to send to Kelly.2 7 Applying the
same facts to the minimum-contacts requirement, the court noted the po-
tential clients' interactions fell in Mink's middle category. Under the
Mink standard, a site allows users to exchange information with a host
computer thus establishing jurisdiction.28
M3Girl Designs LLC v. Purple Mountain Sweaters rests on a third facet
of internet contacts-the third-party payment website and its place on the
Zippo sliding scale.29 M3Girl is a Texas company that manufactures and
18. Jackson v. Hoffman, 312 S.W.3d 146, 149 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010,
no pet.).
19. Id. at 150.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 153.
22. Id. at 155. When determining if Hoffman's email communications were sufficient
to establish personal jurisdiction, the court noted all of Hoffman's "contacts with Texas
were made at the request of appellant [Jackson]." Id. at 156.
23. 679 F. Supp. 2d 755 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
24. Id. at 757.
25. Id. at 758.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 765-66.
28. Id. at 767.
29. NO. 3:09-CV-2334-G, 2010 WL 3699983 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2010).
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sells bottle-cap necklaces. 30 Purple Mountain Sweaters, a sole proprie-
torship owned by Florida resident Bishop, sells crafts and homemade
goods including bottle-cap necklaces.31 M3Girl sued Bishop in a Texas
federal court alleging copyright and trademark infringement for use of
the slogan "Snappy Bottle Cap Necklaces," arguing for Texas jurisdiction
based on Bishop's web presence. 32 The court noted Bishop's website "al-
lows users to browse products, contact the defendants directly, and order
products online using a shopping cart feature," but requires users to ac-
cess PayPal to consummate a sale. 33 This activity fell into the middle
ground of the Zippo sliding scale.34 When considering that scale in light
of defendant's activities, a crucial shortcoming was that Bishop made only
one sale, online or otherwise, to Texas residents.35 Even though one fo-
rum contact can be enough, the court observed "maintenance of a web-
site, even one containing allegedly infringing materials, that is accessible
in the forum state is not enough to establish specific jurisdiction. '36
M3Girl also failed to prove the infringing slogan was present on Bishop's
website when the Texas sale occurred, and even if it was present, the
court concluded asserting jurisdiction violates traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.37
2. Will Contests
Jurisdictional battles sometimes arise in odd settings. One example is
Walz v. Martinez,38 a will contest involving parties in Texas and Mexico.
Fernando Martinez Cobo married Irma Walz in 2004 after being diag-
nosed with prostate cancer. When he died in February 2006, Irma filed a
probate action in Bexar County for Fernando's will dated January 31,
2005. Fernando's children from two prior marriages, all adults and re-
sidents of Mexico, challenged the will's legitimacy. In addition, Fer-
nando's Mexico-based company, Construcciones Modernas de Mexico,
S.A., filed an action in a Texas district court to block disposition of
United States bank accounts. 39
Irma then brought the instant action against Fernando's children claim-
ing fraud, conversion, and civil conspiracy. The trial court granted the
children's special appearances and dismissed the claims.40 Irma ap-
pealed, arguing the children had purposefully availed themselves of Texas
law by contesting the probate action and bringing the second action re-
garding funds in the United States as Construcciones shareholders. The
30. Id. at *1.
31. Id.
32. Id. at *2.
33. Id. at *6.
34. Id.
35. Id. at *7.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 307 S.W.3d 374 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, no pet.).
39. Id. at 377-78.
40. Id. at 378-79.
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Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that under Texas law, the children's
will challenge was not purposeful availment of Texas law because they did
not seek an active role in the Texas probate but merely challenged the
will's legitimacy.4 1 The court further found the lawsuit filed by Construc-
ciones did not implicate the decedent's children even though they were
stockholders in the company, and all of Irma's allegations related to
events occurring in Mexico.42
C. FEDERAL LONG-ARM STATUTES AND NATIONWIDE CONTACTS
Texas long-arm statutes apply in both Texas state and federal courts4 3
except where Congress enacted a federal long-arm statute for certain fed-
eral-law claims.44 This Survey period's only significant federal long-arm
case was Soto v. Vanderbilt Mortgage & Finance, Inc.,45 discussing juris-
diction under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"). The court addressed a question undecided by the Fifth Cir-
cuit, although other district courts in the Fifth Circuit have ruled on the
question. 46 The lawsuit arose from an alleged "widespread scheme to sell
manufactured homes via 'land in lieu transactions.'1, 47 Plaintiffs brought
claims under both RICO and various Texas consumer laws. Several de-
fendants were based in Texas, but nonresident defendant Clayton Homes
objected to personal jurisdiction claiming it was merely a holding com-
pany in Delaware with no agents, sales, or contacts in Texas. 48
In a thorough analysis of federal long-arm and relevant due process
concerns, the court found RICO's federal long-arm statute authorized na-
tionwide service of process and accordingly based its jurisdictional calcu-
lation on all contacts with the United States, rather than with any one
state.49 Because Clayton Homes conceded its presence in Delaware, the
court found it had personal jurisdiction for Ramirez's claim.50 The court
further found it also had pendent personal jurisdiction for plaintiff's re-
lated claims under state law based on the federal claim's jurisdiction. 5 1
41. Id. at 379-82.
42. Id. at 382-83.
43. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
44. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C). Examples of federal long arm statutes include 28
U.S.C. § 2361 (2006) for statutory interpleader and 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006) for claims
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
45. No. C-10-66, 2010 WL 1790177 (S.D. Tex. May 3, 2010).
46. Id. at *3.
47. Id. at *1-2. In particular, defendants sold manufactured homes to buyers, but used
land owned by someone else as collateral, and forged deeds and other documents to make
the sale appear valid. Id.
48. Id. at *3.
49. Id. at *3-4.
50. Id. at *5.




Even when all jurisdictional elements exist, courts may refrain from
litigating cases involving sovereign foreign governments, cases contractu-
ally directed at other forums, cases where convenience dictates another
forum, and cases parallel to other litigation.
1. Derogating Forum-Selection Clauses
The Consent section above discusses forum-selection clauses that es-
tablish local jurisdiction; 52 however, different considerations arise when a
plaintiff sues in a forum contrary to the parties' earlier choice in a forum-
selection clause. These are known as derogation clauses (in regard to that
forum), and instead of justifying a court's retention of the case, deroga-
tion clauses require the court to consider declining its otherwise valid ju-
risdiction. During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court issued
three opinions reversing lower-court rejections of derogating forum
clauses. Interestingly, both the trial court and the court of appeals disre-
garded the clauses in all three cases and the supreme court reversed with-
out dissent.
In re ADM Investor Services, Inc.53 involved an elderly plaintiff's claim
for fraud, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty arising from commodi-
ties trading. In 2001, Jetta Prescott contracted with commodities trader
ADM with the provision that ADM could close out and collect any defi-
cit from broker/guarantor Texas Trading when Prescott's deficit reached
$50,000. In 2004, her deficit exceeded $57,000. ADM closed the account
and collected from Texas Trading. In turn, Texas Trading's CEO Charles
Dawson sued Prescott in Hopkins County, Texas, seeking
reimbursement. 54
Prescott then sued both ADM and Texas Trading, filed in Rains
County rather than Hopkins County, and ignored ADM contract's desig-
nation of Illinois as a forum invocable at ADM's discretion. After Texas
Trading moved to transfer venue to Hopkins County, ADM filed its an-
swer and a motion to dismiss because of its right to elect the Illinois fo-
rum. With the motion to dismiss, ADM also moved in the alternative to
change venue to Hopkins County. ADM did nothing further and Texas
Trading set its motion to transfer venue for hearing. ADM then gave
notice it would not attend the venue transfer hearing to avoid waiving of
its motion to dismiss. The trial court granted Texas Trading's motion to
transfer to Hopkins County, but later denied ADM's motion to dismiss.
ADM sought mandamus relief, which the court of appeals denied on the
grounds that ADM waived its Illinois forum option.55
The supreme court reversed, holding Texas law presumed against fo-
rum-clause waivers, and ADM's pursuit of alternative defenses, along
52. See supra Part I.A.
53. 304 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2010).




with its dilatory objection, did not amount to waiver.56 The supreme court
further rejected Prescott's claim that her age-nearing eighty-and her
poor health made an Illinois forum severely prejudicial to her claims.57
The supreme court noted she had not substantiated that claim and al-
lowing unsupported claims of hardship would render forum clauses
"practically useless.158
The Texas Supreme Court reached the same conclusion-no waiver
from dilatory forum challenges-in the second case, In re Laibe Corp.59
This lawsuit arose from Laibe's sale of a drilling rig to Texas-based Jack-
son Drilling Services, L.P. Jackson "had problems with the rig and sued
Laibe in Wise County," contrary to the contract's designation of state or
federal courts in Marion County, Indiana as having exclusive jurisdic-
tion.60 Laibe lost its forum challenge at both the trial and appellate
levels. 61 The supreme court reversed, finding: (1) the forum clause's ab-
sence in the initial sales agreement was cured by its inclusion in the in-
voice along with a merger clause combining both documents into one
contract;62 (2) Jackson's argument that the Indiana forum was inconve-
nient was unpersuasive; 63 and (3) Laibe's two-month delay in seeking
mandamus relief from the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss did
not waive its right to enforce the forum clause.64
In re Lisa Laser USA, Inc.65 dealt with an expansive interpretation of a
restrictive forum clause regarding both the claims and parties to which it
applied. HealthTronics, Inc. is a Georgia corporation based in Texas. In
2005, HealthTronics signed an exclusive distribution agreement with Lisa
USA for American distribution of certain products made by Lisa USA's
parent, Lisa Germany.66 In 2008, Lisa USA notified HealthTronics it was
in default of their agreement because it was not using its best efforts to
market the products. HealthTronics denied default and argued Lisa La-
ser had breached on several points and was now competing directly with
HealthTronics in violation of their agreement. HealthTronics then sued
Lisa USA and Lisa Germany in Travis County. Lisa USA moved to dis-
miss based on the agreement's exclusive forum clause pointing to Ala-
meda County, California. As with the two preceding Survey period cases,
defendant's motion failed in both the trial court and the court of
56. Id. at 374-75.
57. Id. at 375.
58. Id. at 375-76. The court reached the same conclusion regarding to Prescott's claim
of inconvenience at having to pursue two alleged tortfeasors in different states. Id. at 375.
59. 307 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. 2010).
60. Id. at 315-16.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 316-17.
63. Id. at 317-18. This finding echoed the court's similar finding in In re ADM In-
veitor Services, Inc. that plaintiff failed to substantiate her claim of ill health, and allowing
unsubstantiated arguments would render forum clauses useless. See supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
64. Id. at 318.
65. 310 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. 2010).




The Texas Supreme Court reversed and ordered dismissal.68 It first
rejected HealthTronics's argument that the forum clause related only to
"sales by Seller . . to HealthTronic," and not to claims based on the
parties' relationships.69 This argument was based on the forum clause's
placement in Exhibit F of the distribution agreement and related wording
that arguably narrowed the clause's focus. The supreme court held that
forum clause interpretation required a "common-sense examination" of
the entire agreement and claims in the instant case. 70 Applying that stan-
dard, the supreme court deemed the forum clause's reference to "this
Agreement" as applying to the parties' entire agreement rather than the
immediate language surrounding the forum clause.71 HealthTronics also
argued the forum clause did not govern its action against parent corpora-
tion Lisa Germany because the latter was not mentioned in the exhibit
containing the clause. The supreme court noted Lisa Germany was logi-
cally omitted from Exhibit F because sales did not occur between it and
HealthTronics, but also that the larger Distribution Agreement, which
Lisa Germany was a party, specifically incorporated Exhibit F's terms by
reference. 72
Reviewing the supreme court's action on forum clauses in this Survey
period, it is notable that the supreme court reversed lower court decisions
in all three cases rejecting clauses based on their ambiguity or restrictive
wording. In so doing, the supreme court signaled a more expansive Texas
practice of enforcing forum clauses designating foreign forums, calling for
expansive interpretation of these clauses as to enforcement waivers, and
drafting uncertainties as to parties and claims.
International Metal Sales, Inc. v. Global Steel Corp.73 is an unreported
case from the Austin Court of Appeals that addresses an issue worthy of
reporting. International Metal Sales (IMS) and defendant Global Steel
were both steel-product distributors and conducted business with each
other since the 1990s. When IMS sued Global Steel in Williamson
County over issues of product quality and financial dealings, Global
moved to dismiss based on an exclusive forum clause requiring all litiga-
tion to be brought in state or federal courts in Pennsylvania. That clause
was not part of any agreement between the parties, and neither IMS nor
Kimberly Lerch, IMS's sale employee, had signed anything approving the
clause. Instead, it only appeared on the back of invoices sent to IMS for
67. Id. at 882-83.
68. Id. at 887.
69. Id. at 884.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 884-86.
72. Id. at 886-87. Noting HealthTronics would have to accept the terms of the con-
tract it was enforcing against Lisa Germany, the court noted "a plaintiff 'cannot both have
his contract and defeat it too."' Id. at 886 (quoting In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d
127, 135 (Tex. 2005)).




payment of steel shipments. The trial court honored the clause and dis-
missed IMS's lawsuit. 74
The court of appeals reversed after meticulous analysis of contract for-
mation under UCC Article 2.75 The court concluded the forum clause
was not binding because it only appeared in post-formation documents,
was never agreed to by IMS, and IMS's failure to object to the invoices
was not assent to altering the contract. In reaching this decision, the
court made important distinctions between formation and post formation
issues, and the equally important conclusion that silence is not a basis for
a forum clause.76
2. Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals
Forum non conveniens, or inconvenient forum, is an old common-law
objection to jurisdiction based on significant inconvenience to one or
more defendants. It is also available by statute in the federal system and
in many states for intrajurisdictional transfers not requiring dismissal.77
Where interstate or international case movement is involved, forum non
conveniens is truly jurisdictional because it involves a forum's declining
of otherwise-valid jurisdiction, as well as dismissal of the local case, for
refiling in a distinct forum.
Intra-federal transfers under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 are not considered here
because they do not implicate conflicts between states or nations, even
though these transfers may involve significant distances. This Article is
limited to common law interjurisdictional forum non conveniens availa-
ble in Texas state and federal courts under the same two-part test requir-
ing a movant to show availability of an adequate alternative forum and a
balancing of private and public interests favoring transfer.78
74. Id. at *1-2.
75. Id. at *5-9 (interpreting TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.204-2.207 (West
2009)).
76. Id. at *10-12.
77. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404 (2006) is the federal statutory provision for inconvenient forum
objections seeking transfer to another federal court. Texas law provides for in-state venue
transfers based on convenience. See TEX. Civ. PRec. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(b)
(West 2002).
78. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gil-
bert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403, 424 (5th
Cir. 2001). The private factors look to parties' convenience and include "the 'relative ease
of access to sources of proof; [the] availability of compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; [the] possibility of
view of premises, if ... appropriate... ; and all other practical problems that make trial...
easy, expeditious and inexpensive."' McLennan, 245 F.3d at 424 (alterations in original)
(quoting Dickson Marine, Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 1999)). The
public factors look to courts' concerns and a forum state's interests, and "include the 'ad-
ministrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home; the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum
familiar with the law that must govern the action; the avoidance of problems ... in conflict
of laws . . . ; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury
duty."' Id. Texas forum non conveniens law is multi-faceted. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 71.051 (West 2008). The Texas statute applies to personal injury and wrong-
ful death claims. Common-law forum non conveniens, in line with Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gil-
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In Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Management Team, LLC,79 the Texas Su-
preme Court clarified important presumptions in forum non conveniens
practice and linked Texas law to long-time common law precedent articu-
lated by the United States Supreme Court. Respondent Signature Man-
agement Team (Team) filed an action against defendant Quixtar in Collin
County alleging various business torts. Team is a Michigan-based Nevada
corporation, and Quixtar is a Michigan-based Virginia corporation and
the successor entity to Amway Corporation. Team engaged in motiva-
tional training and sold its materials to vendors (known as Independent
Business Owners or IBOs) of Quixtar products. The dispute arose in
Michigan over Quixtar's complaint that Team-affiliated IBOs were pro-
moting improper and possibly illegal sales practices that would harm
Quixtar. In response, Quixtar terminated its agreements with those
IBOs, resulting in Team and its affiliated IBOs filing lawsuits around the
country seeking injunctive relief against Quixtar's termination and dam-
ages. Although other courts declined injunctive relief, the district court
in Collin County granted it.80
Pointing out both parties are based in Michigan, Quixtar moved for a
forum non conveniens dismissal and conceded plaintiff could refile in
Michigan.81 The trial court granted Quixtar's dismissal motion but the
Dallas Court of Appeals reversed, concluding factors pointing to Michi-
gan litigation were not enough to overcome plaintiff's right to choose the
forum.82 The Texas Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision, em-
phasizing the presumption favoring plaintiff's choice of forum is less for
nonresident plaintiffs.8 3 Specifically, the supreme court held a "defen-
dant's 'heavy burden' applies with 'less force' when plaintiff is a
nonresident. '8 4
In re Ensco Offshore International Co. 85 involved the death of an Aus-
tralian citizen working for an Australian company on a Singapore rig
owned by Dallas companies. Decedent's wife filed two lawsuits, the first
against her husband's employer Total Marine Services ("TMS") in Aus-
tralia, and the second against the Dallas-based owners of the drilling rig
(collectively referred to here as "ENSCO"). ENSCO moved for a forum
non conveniens dismissal citing abundance of relevant evidence in Singa-
pore and Australia contrasted with relatively sparse evidence in Dallas,
bert, governs all other interstate and international forum convenience issues in Texas state
courts. See In re Smith Barney, Inc., 975 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1998).
79. 315 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. 2010).
80. Id. at 29-30.
81. Quixtar argued the witnesses were primarily located in Michigan and the expense
of obtaining their testimony by deposition, or alternatively their attendance in Texas, com-
pelled litigation in Michigan. Id. at 34.
82. See Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC v. Quixtar, Inc., 281 S.W.3d 666, 674 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2009), rev'd, 315 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. 2010), discussed at James P. George, Wm.
Frank Carroll & Stephanie K. Marshall, Conflict of Laws, 63 SMU L. REv. 455, 467 (2010).
83. Quixtar, Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 315 S.W.3d 28, 35 (Tex. 2010).
84. Id. at 32 (citing Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422,
430 (2007), Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981), and other cases).
85. 311 S.W.3d 921 (Tex. 2010).
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and the convenience of presenting that evidence if Singapore or Australia
was the forum. The district court denied the motion and the Dallas Court
of Appeals denied mandamus relief. The Texas Supreme Court reversed,
rejecting plaintiff's argument that defendants were required to demon-
strate the superior convenience of a single foreign forum instead of the
"amalgamated" convenience of multiple foreign jurisdictions.8 6 The su-
preme court additionally cited the importance of choice of law in a forum
non conveniens analysis and the likelihood that Singapore or Australia
would provide the governing law here.8 7
II. CHOICE OF LAW
Like personal jurisdiction and judgment enforcement, applicable sub-
stantive law is a question involving both forum law and constitutional
issues. Understanding these issues requires a clear focus on basic princi-
ples. First, choice of law is a question of state law in both state and fed-
eral courts.88 Second, it is a question of forum state law. Renvoi-the
practice of using another state's choice-of-law rule-is almost never em-
ployed unless a forum state directs it, and even then, the forum state re-
mains in control. 89 Third, the forum state has broad power to make
choice-of-law decisions, either legislatively or judicially, subject only to
limited constitutional requirements. 90
Within the forum state's control is a hierarchy of choice-of-law rules.
At the top are legislative choice-of-law statutes directing application of a
certain state's laws, based on events or people important to operation of
each specific law.91 Second in choice-of-law hierarchy is party controlled
choice of law where choice-of-law clauses in contracts control unless pub-
86. Id. at 924-25.
87. Id. at 928.
88. See Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941).
89. The Restatement (Second) creates a presumption against renvoi except for limited
circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8 (1971). Although
commentators defend the limited use of renvoi, they acknowledge its general lack of ac-
ceptance in the United States except in limited circumstances, usually found in statutes
directing use of renvoi. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 134-39 (3d ed.
2000); Weintraub, supra note 1, at 88-94. Texas law provides for renvoi in TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.105, 2.402(b), 4.102(b), 8.106, 9.103 (West 2009). For federal courts,
Klaxon reiterates a forum state's control of choice of law. Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 497.
90. The due process clause is the primary limit on state choice-of-law rules, requiring a
reasonable or at least minimal connection between the dispute and law being applied. See
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 799 (1985); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S.
397, 407 (1930); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 680 (Tex. 2004); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 and comments following; SCOLES
ET AL., supra note 89, at 145-76; Weintraub, supra note 1, at 585-648. Choice-of-law limits
under full faith and credit are now questionable after Franchise Tax Board of Cal. v. Hyatt,
538 U.S. 488 (2003).
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1) & cmt. a; see, e.g., Owens
Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Tex. 1999) (applying an earlier version of the Texas
wrongful death statute, requiring a court "apply the rules of substantive law that are appro-
priate under the facts of the case," citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031
(West 2008) (as amended in 1997 with the same wording as this provision)).
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lic policy dictates otherwise.92 Third in the hierarchy is common law, now
controlled in Texas by the most significant relationship test of the Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 93 This Survey article is organ-
ized according to this hierarchy, that is, statutory choice of law, followed
by choice-of-law clauses, and concludes with choice of law under the most
significant relationship test. Special issues like constitutional limitations
are discussed in the following section. This case grouping results in a dis-
cussion that mixes Texas Supreme Court opinions with those of Texas
intermediate appellate courts, federal district courts, and the Fifth Cir-
cuit. Despite this mix, readers should note that because choice of law is a
state law issue, the only binding opinions are those of the Texas Supreme
Court. 94
A. STATUTORY CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES
The Survey period offered two notable cases, one involving the corpo-
rate affairs doctrine and the second involving bankruptcy exemption
under state law. Phillips v. United Heritage Corp.95 was an action by a
Utah securities corporation against the officers and directors of Black Sea
Investments, Inc., a securities entity in the Turks and Caicos Islands.
Plaintiffs previously obtained a judgment against Black Sea, and now
sought to pierce the veil and enforce the judgment against Black Sea's
officers and directors. The trial court instructed the jury to apply Texas
law regarding veil piercing, and as a result, the jury found against Black
Sea's officers and directors.96 The court of appeals reversed. Noting the
corporate affairs doctrine applies the law of a foreign corporation's
originating jurisdiction to govern shareholders' liability for corporate
debts, in a case of first impression the court extended the doctrine to
cover non-shareholder officers and directors, 97 under which the veil could
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1988) ((Law of the
State Chosen by the Parties) allowing contracting parties to choose a governing law, within
defined limits.) Texas has adopted § 187. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d
670, 677-78 (Tex. 1990).
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971), listing seven
balancing factors: (a) needs of interstate and international systems, (b) relevant policies of
the forum, (c) relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those
states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) protection of justified expectations,
(e) basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability, and
uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied. This listing is not by priority, which varies from case to case. Id. at cmt. c. In a
larger sense, the most significant relationship test includes the other choice of law sections
throughout the Restatement (Second).
94. The exception is when a federal court rules on a constitutional issue such as legisla-
tive jurisdiction or full faith and credit or federal questions such as foreign sovereign im-
munity. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp., 135 S.W.3d at 680 (Tex. 2004) (legislative
jurisdiction).
95. 319 S.W.3d 156 (Tex. App.-Waco 2010, no pet.); see also In re Park Cent. Global
Litig., No. 3:09-CV-0765-M, 2010 WL 3119403 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (a more routine applica-
tion of the corporate affairs doctrine applying Delaware law to Delaware entities and
Texas law to Texas entities in a class action for investment fraud).
96. Phillips, 319 S.W.3d at 159-60.
97. Id. at 163.
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not be pierced. 98
In re Garrett99 provides an excellent discussion of split case law regard-
ing the Bankruptcy Code's choice-of-law rule for state-law judgment ex-
emption. In this case, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee objected to
exemptions claimed by Texas-resident debtors based on their prior resi-
dency in North Carolina. The Bankruptcy Code allows debtors to claim
exemptions under the "[s]tate or local law that is applicable on the date
of the filing of the petition at the place in which the debtor's domicile has
been located for the 730 days immediately preceding. . . ."0 The debt-
ors had moved from North Carolina to Texas a few months before filing
for bankruptcy. The trustee rejected their exemptions under North Caro-
lina law based on that state's restriction of judgment exemptions to peo-
ple residing in North Carolina and express exclusion of any
extraterritorial effect. 10 1 The court discussed the split case law and then
explored every angle of bankruptcy law as well as broader preemption
policies, concluding the minority opinion, that Congress intended to pre-
empt inconsistent state restrictions with the language allowing a 730 day
look-back, was correct. 10 2
B. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TEST
In the absence of a statutory choice-of-law rule or an effective choice-
of-law clause, Texas courts apply the Restatement's' 0 3 most significant
relationship test.1°4
1. Contracts With Choice-of-Law Clauses
Texas law and the Restatement permit contracting parties to choose a
governing law,10 5 as reflected in six Survey-period cases-two bearing
discussion and four notable for litigant's failed arguments. Vexas, LLC v.
Hill Enterprises, LLC involved a claim arising from independent contrac-
98. Id. at 167-68.
99. 429 B.R. 220 (S.D. Tex. 2010), amended and superseded by, 4325 B.R. 434 (S.D.
Tex. 2010).
100. Id. at 223 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) (West 2010)).
101. Id. at 222-24.
102. Id. at 224-41; see also In re Arrendondo-Smith, 436 B.R. 412 (S.D. Tex. 2010)
(California permitted extraterritorial application of its exemption law).
103. Embodiment of the most significant relationship test involves seven factors bal-
anced according to needs of the particular case. They are: "(a) [T]he needs of the inter-
state and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant
policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determina-
tion of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies
underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result,
and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971). This listing is not by priority and varies
from case to case. Id. at cmt. c. In a larger sense, the most significant relationship test
includes other choice-of-law sections throughout the Restatement.
104. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 678 (Tex. 1990).
105. See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 677; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
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tor agreements between companies screening urine specimens.10 6 While
the original contracting parties were from Texas, the disputed agreements
had California choice-of-law clauses. Defendants objected to plaintiffs'
pleadings under California law, arguing all the contracting parties "are
Texas entities with no substantial relationship to California. °1 0 7 The
court noted all parties agreed to the provision selecting California law
and conducted a thorough Restatement analysis looking for any excep-
tion invalidating the contract's designation. The court concluded no ex-
ceptions applied and California law governed the contract dispute.1 08
Space does not allow a full discussion here, but readers are referred to
this opinion for a textbook discussion of contract and tort choice of law
considerations. The court's tort discussion concluded California law ap-
plied because the underlying claim was about the existence, ownership,
and protection of trade secrets of intervening plaintiff Millennium, a Cali-
fornia entity based in San Diego.10 9
In Wynne v. American Express Co.,11 ° plaintiff-card member Wynne
sued American Express for deceptive trade practices regarding its adver-
tised no-spending-limits. He brought the claim under Texas law in a
Texas court despite the credit card agreement's arbitration clause and
designation of Utah law. Wynne did not directly dispute the choice of
Utah law (and thus could have waived any objection), but the court none-
theless analyzed the conflict before concluding Utah law governed and it
compelled arbitration."'
Because this dispute sounded under the Uniform Commercial Code,
the court could have simply relied on the relevant statutory provision ap-
proving contractual choices of law bearing a reasonable relationship to
the transaction. 112 The court went further instead, choosing to analyze
"reasonable relationship" under the Restatement's guidelines. It noted
that American Express was located in Utah, the cardholder agreement
was entered into in Utah, and the account was held in Utah." 3 The court
further ensured the application of Utah law was not contrary to a funda-
mental policy of Texas, holding plaintiff failed to demonstrate the agree-
ment's violation of either Texas or Utah law." 1 4
Four opinions rejected reliance on, or challenges to, choice-of-law
clauses based on the challenger's inadequate briefing or pleading.
1 5
106. No. A-09-CA-791-SS, 2010 WL 3655850, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2010).
107. Id.
108. Id. at *3.
109. Id. at *3-4 (applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 6 (the most significant relation-
ship test) and § 145 (the basic tort principle)).
110. No. 2:09-CV-00260-TJW, 2010 WL 3860362 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2010).
111. Id. at *3-4.
112. Id. at *3 (citing TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.301(a) (West 2009)).
113. Id.
114. Id. at *5.
115. See Drummond Am., LLC v. Share Corp., 692 F. Supp. 2d 650 (E.D. Tex. 2010)
(neither party invoked the contract's choice of Illinois law and thus conceded to Texas
law); Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Turnkey E & P Inc., No. H-09-0522, 2009 WL 5220648
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2009) (inferring Canada-based Turnkey is concession that Texas law
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2. Contracts Without Choice-of-Law Clauses
The Survey period produced two-and-a-half opinions regarding law
governing contracts missing choice of law designations. Contractor's
Source Inc. v. Hanes Companies, Inc. involves an action to recover conse-
quential damages resulting from defendants' alleged defective prod-
ucts.1 16 Plaintiff Contractor's is a Houston-based company that
manufactures woven fabrics. It bought "silt fence fabric" in a series of
purchases from defendant Hanes, a company with an ambiguous princi-
pal location in Dallas or North Carolina. n 7 Contractor's sued for breach
of contract, alleging Hanes's defective products resulted in lost customers
and future business; Hanes denied the breach and affirmatively defended
their underlying agreement precluded recovery of consequential damages
because of a clause appearing on some, invoices." 8
Plaintiff asserted its claims under Texas law. Defendant argued for
North Carolina law, but suggested to the court it was likely a false conflict
because the issue was governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.119
The court rejected the false conflict possibility noting verification re-
quired a difficult assessment of both states' UCC case law. 120 Instead the
court conducted a Restatement analysis under both the general contracts
section and the most significant relationship test.121 The court's initial
analysis did not produce a clear result 122 so the court inquired further
into the contacts' qualitative value, which favored Texas.' 23 Because the
court indulged that further qualitative inquiry, Contractor's Source is a
valuable example guide for attorneys and judges applying the nuances of
the Restatement's sometimes open-ended factors.
Specialties of Mexico, Inc. v. Masterfoods USA demonstrates the use of
choice-of-law analyses in a federal motion to dismiss for failure to state a
governed because Turnkey disputed the contract's validity but cited only Texas case law);
Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc. No. 04-09-00230-CV, 2010 WL 3406302
(Tex. App.-San Antonio Aug. 31, 2010, pet. filed) (rejecting Paradigm's objection to at-
torney fees under Texas law instead of contractually-designated California law for Para-
digm's failure to request judicial notice of California law earlier in the case); Boss Hoss
Cycles of Hous., L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 14-08-00648-CV, 2010 WL 307955
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 26, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Boss Hoss's
inadequate briefing as grounds for rejecting its challenge to the trial court's application of
Missouri law).
116. No. 09-cv-0069, 2009 WL 6443116, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2009).
117. After noting the uncertainty the court concluded Hanes had its principal place of
business in North Carolina. Id. at *3 n.6.
118. Id. at *1-2.
119. Id. at *2 n.4. The opinion is silent here on to which UCC sections are implicated
but later analyzes the provisions under several sections of UCC Article 2. Id. at *5-9.
120. Id.
121. Id. at *2-3, *3 n.5. The general contract section includes (a) the place of the con-
tracting, (b) the place of negotiation, (c) the place of performance, (d) the location of the
contract's subject matter, and (e) the parties' domicile, residence, nationality, place of in-
corporation, and place of business. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 188. For the factors in the most significant relationship test, see supra note 92.
122. Id. at *3.
123. The court found Texas contacts were superior and Texas had a greater interest in
the case's resolution. Id. at *3-5.
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claim.124 Plaintiff Specialties is a Texas corporation located in Laredo.
Masterfoods is a Delaware corporation owned by Mars, Inc. Both have
related or sub-entities in Mexico, and the dispute concerned various
agreements regarding resale and distribution of candy in Mexico. 125
Plaintiff brought contract claims under Texas law and tort claims under
Texas and Mexican law. The court applied factors from both the Restate-
ment's contracts and tort sections to conclude Texas law governed all the
claims and then dismissed all claims except fraud and negligent
misrepresentation. 126
In a similar vein, McFadin v. Gerber 27 used a clipped choice-of-law
analysis to support a jurisdictional conclusion. The McFadins are a hus-
band and wife team who produce custom handbags. They sued three of
their sales representatives for selling knock-off versions of their product.
The McFadins are from Texas and the Gerbers (another married couple)
covered sales territories in the Rocky Mountain states and were based in
Denver.128 In declining Texas jurisdiction over the Gerbers, the court
noted plaintiffs traveled to Colorado to set up the relationship, the con-
tract appeared to have been formed in Colorado, and under Restatement
(Second) § 188, Colorado law governed the contract.' 29
3. Commercial Torts
Hoffart v. Wiggins130 involved a pro se lawsuit alleging a fraudulent
investment scheme, brought by seventy-six-year-old Sylvester Hoffart on
his own behalf and as his wife's guardian. Defendants, family members in
Oregon, persuaded the Hoffarts in 1981 to entrust their life savings ex-
ceeding $200,000 with the defendants who would invest it at a guaranteed
return of 8.5% annually. Plaintiff alleged by 1985 defendants had con-
verted the money to their own use. The Hoffarts demanded the money's
return and unsuccessfully complained to police in Oregon. Over several
years defendants returned portions of the money and had returned half
by November 2004 but no more afterward.' 31
In 2005, the Hoffarts hired two attorneys and sued the Oregon defend-
ants in Liberty County, Texas, but Mr. Hoffart eventually fired the attor-
neys and the case was dismissed. 132 In 2006, the Hoffarts hired an
124. No. L-09-88, 2010 WL 2488031 (S.D. Tex. June 14, 2010).
125. Id. at *1-3.
126. Id. at *5, *12.
127. 587 F.3d 753 (5th Cir. 2009).
128. Id. at 756-57.
129. Id. at 760 n.19. The court affirmed jurisdiction over another defendant with better
Texas contacts. Id. at 763.
130. No. 1:08-CV-46, 2010 WL 816915 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2010), adopted in part, re-
jected in part, No. 1:08-CV-46, 2010 WL 816863 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2010), affd in part,
vacated in part, No. 10-40209, 2010 WL 5416802 (5th Cir. Dec. 22, 2010). This portion of
the case is taken from the federal magistrate judge's recommendation limited to the por-
tion the district court later adopted. See id. at *1-16. The district court rejected the magis-
trate judge's recommendation on the issue of preclusion.
131. Id. at *2.
132. Id. at *3.
[Vol. 64
Conflict of Laws
Oregon lawyer to bring claims under Oregon's elder-abuse statute, which
they lost on summary judgment, and breach of contract, which they lost
in jury trial. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the summary judg-
ment, but the Hoffarts fired their lawyer and voluntarily dismissed that
action and obtained a dismissal without prejudice, which is important for
the Texas court's preclusion ruling.133
In 2008, Mr. Hoffart sued in federal court in Beaumont, bringing claims
again under the Oregon elder-abuse statute and a claim of identity theft
under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. In the event Oregon law did
not apply, Mr. Hoffart brought alternative claims under Texas law for
breach of fiduciary duty, forgery, fraud, constructive trust, unjust enrich-
ment, and promissory estoppel, but no claim for breach of contract. The
federal district court dismissed the Fair Credit identity theft claims and
then considered which state's law governed the other claims.'
34
The federal magistrate judge conducted a particularly thorough choice-
of-law analysis, applying Restatement (Second) section 148 for fraud, sec-
tion 221 for restitution, section 145 for the general tort claims, and section
6 for the overriding most significant relationship test. The court analyzed
the available facts for each claim and noted a difficult conclusion because
both states had significant connections to the parties and underlying
events. 135 The court held Texas law governed, then turned to the remain-
ing issues of limitations and preclusion. As to limitations, the court dis-
missed Texas claims with two-year limitation periods and retained those
with four-year periods. 136 This Article's Judgments section discusses the
preclusion issue.137 The opinion bears reading not only for the court's
thorough application of multiple Restatement sections, but also for the
court's careful patience in dealing with a pro se plaintiff's case.
Northern Marine Underwriters, LTD v. FBI Express, Inc. is an example
of tort choice of law applied in a commercial case underwritten by a con-
tact where the plaintiff and defendant were not contracting parties.'
38
Northern Marine is a British company that insured Richard Haworth,
Ltd, another British company. Richard Haworth hired FBI Express to
transport rolls of fabric from South Carolina to San Pedro, Cholula Pue-
bla, Mexico. FBI was a shipping broker and had hired a Texas-based
shipper, JAMCO. 139 When the second shipment was hijacked in Mexico,
Northern Marine brought a subrogee action in federal court in Houston
claiming FBI had secondary liability. Northern Marine's claims were
based on federal statute, federal common law, and alternatively, Mexican
133. Id.
134. Id. at *3-6.
135. The court also commented on the Restatement's lack of mechanical precision. Id.
at *7 (as if any multi-factor balancing tests offers that precision).
136. Id. at *10-15.
137. See infra notes 156-73 and accompanying text.
138. 697 F. Supp. 2d 695 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
139. Id. at 698-99.
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law. Defendant FBI argued Texas law controlled. 140 The court was thus
faced with choosing the governing law for a British insurer's claims
against a California shipping broker, for claims arising from a Texas ship-
per's loss of a British customer's goods in a shipment from South Caro-
lina to Mexico, where the loss was in Mexico. The court quickly found no
center to the parties' relationship. 141 The court rested its conclusion that
Texas law governed because FBI traveled to Laredo to inspect the ship-
per's facilities before hiring them and Texas was the final place of oppor-
tunity to implement security measures prior to entry into Mexico. 42
Berry v. Bryan Cave LLP 143 was a multi-district litigation case regard-
ing fraud in issuance of life insurance policies used in defined benefit
plans. This case provides an excellent discussion of several mass-litiga-
tion issues including the law governing MDL transfers and application of
multiple states' laws in class action cases. The court declined a full
choice-of-law analysis because the facts were not yet developed, but did
question plaintiffs' premise that Arizona law governs all claims based on
the court's reference to the third factor in the most significant relation-
ship test.144
4. Non-Commercial Torts
The Survey period included three noteworthy choice-of-law opinions
involving non-commercial torts in a non-class action setting. Enterprise
Products Partners, L.P. v. Mitchell145 offers an especially thorough analy-
sis regarding a Mississippi pipeline explosion and the balancing of public
policies leading to application of Texas law. In 2007, a liquid propane
pipeline exploded near Carmichael, Mississippi, creating a gas cloud that
ignited into a fireball killing nearby residents. Their survivors and other
victims sued in Harris County, Texas, alleging negligence and other
claims against Enterprise and Dixie Pipeline Company, Delaware corpo-
rations based in Houston. Because of the victims' Mississippi domicile
and the accident's location, defendants moved for application of Missis-
sippi's $1 million damage cap on non-economic damages arguing Missis-
sippi had the strongest interest because of the victims' Mississippi
domicile and the accident's location. All parties agreed Texas law gov-
erned the remaining issues. The trial court ruled Texas law governed all
damages claims and defendants took an interlocutory appeal. 146
The court of appeals affirmed, applying the Restatement's section on
140. Id. at 700-02.
141. Id. at 702.
142. Id. at 702-03.
143. No. 3:08-CV-2035-B, MDL No. 1983, 2010 WL 1904885 (N.D. Tex. May 11, 2010).
144. Id. at *3-4. See also companion opinion in the same action, Berry v. Bryan Cave
LLP, No. 3:08-CV-2035-B, MDL No. 1983, 2010 WL 1946264 (N.D. Tex. May 11, 2010).
145. No. 01-09-00653-CV, 2010 WL 3294243 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] Aug. 19,
2010, no pet.), abrogated by 2011 WL 693700 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 10,
2011, pet. filed).
146. Id. at *1.
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general torts and most significant relationship test.147 The court greatly
examined underlying policies behind the conflicting Texas and Mississippi
laws, concluding because the Mississippi explosion was fortuitous-it
could have happened anywhere along the pipeline's 1,300 mile span-
Texas had a stronger interest in regulating its own companies. 148 The
court further found Mississippi's tort-reform policy of ending "the state's
hell-hole reputation and attract[ing] more business" was not implicated
because the pipeline was built in the 1960s with no reliance on Missis-
sippi's tort-reform policies. 149
McLead v. L-3 Communications Vertex Aerospace, L.L.C., involving a
motion to designate the United States and U.S. Army as responsible non-
parties in a case concerning a helicopter crash in Iraq killing fourteen
American servicemen, briefly discusses the role of choice of law in con-
sideration of a motion to designate.1 50
C. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
The Survey period produced four instructive applications of the general
rule that forum law governs procedure, which also demonstrated that
substance-procedure distinction may be difficult. In In re Lisa Laser
USA, Inc. ,'51 a defendant argued the contract section containing a forum
clause and choice-of-law clause (both designating California) required
the forum clause be interpreted under California law. Although the court
ultimately enforced the forum clause and dismissed the case, it rejected
this argument because it found the availability of mandamus relief was a
matter of procedure and necessarily governed by forum law.152 A federal
district court in Texas quoted federal precedent for the opposite result
finding a forum clause's validity is a matter of state contract law and thus
substantive law.153
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP v. Brown Sims, P.C.154 was a
miscellaneous action (tangential to other litigation) in a Houston federal
court seeking to quash a subpoena related to discovery in a Florida fed-
eral case. The court held that although federal law governed the proce-
dural elements, the issue of privilege is substantive and governed by
either Texas or Florida privilege law; the court also found a false conflict
and applied Texas law.155 Midwest Medical Supply Co., L.L. C. v. Wingert
held that while plaintiff's entitlement to attorney fees in a contract action
was a matter of substantive law governed by the parties' chosen Missouri
147. Id. at *2-4.
148. Id. at *3.
149. Id. at *4.
150. No. C-08-264, 2010 WL 143715 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2010).
151. 310 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. 2010).
152. Id. at 883 n.2.
153. See Valero Mktg. & Supply Co., v. Baldwin Contracting Co., No. H-09-2957, 2010
WL 1068105, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2010).
154. No. 4:09-mc-365, 2010 WL 56045 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2010).
155. Id. at *3-4.
2011]
SMU LAW REVIEW
law, forum law governed recovery of costs. 156
III. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Foreign judgments from other states and countries create Texas con-
flict-of-laws issues in two ways: (1) local enforcement, and (2) preclusive
effect on local lawsuits. Texas recognizes two methods of enforcing for-
eign judgments: the common-law method using foreign judgment basis
for a local lawsuit, 157 and since 1981, the more direct procedure under the
two uniform judgments acts. 158 Section 36.007 of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code expressly reserves the enforcement right of non-
monetary judgments under traditional, non-statutory standards,159 along
with similar acts for arbitration awards, 160 child custody,161 and child sup-
port.162 Federal judgments may be enforced in any other federal district
as local judgments 63 or as sister-state judgments in Texas state courts.
The Survey period's most notable foreign-judgment analysis involved
156. 317 S.W.3d 530 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.).
157. The underlying mandate for common-law enforcement is the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, and its statutory coun-
terpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006). The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act
specifically reserves the common-law method as an alternative. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 35.008 (West 2008).
158. Sister-state judgments are enforced under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act (UEFJA). TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.001-.008 (West
2008). The Act requires (1) the judgment creditor to file a copy of the judgment authenti-
cated under federal or Texas law, and (2) notice to be sent to the judgment debtor from the
clerk or the judgment creditor. Id. § 35.003-005. The judgment debtor may (1) move to
stay enforcement if grounds exist under Texas law or the rendering state, and (2) challenge
enforcement along traditional full faith and credit grounds such as rendering a state's lack
of personal or subject matter jurisdiction. Id. §§ 35.006, 35.003. Foreign-country judg-
ments for money are enforced under the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments
Recognition Act (UFCMJRA). TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.001-.008
(West 2008). Like the UEFJA, the UFCMJRA requires the judgment creditor to file a
copy of the foreign-country judgment previously authenticated under federal or Texas law,
with notice to the debtor provided either by the clerk or the creditor. Id. § 36.0041-.0043.
The judgment debtor has thirty days to challenge enforcement, or sixty days if "domiciled
in a foreign country," with a twenty-day extension available for good cause. Id. at
§ 36.0044. Unlike the UEFJA, the UFCMJRA explicitly states ten grounds for non-recog-
nition-three mandatory and seven discretionary. Id. § 36.005. Briefly stated, the
mandatory grounds are (1) lack of an impartial tribunal, (2) lack of personal jurisdiction,
and (3) lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. § 36.005(a). Discretionary grounds for non-
recognition are the foreign action (1) involved inadequate notice, (2) "was obtained by
fraud," (3) violates Texas public policy, (4) is contrary to another final judgment, (5) is
contrary to the parties' agreement (for example, a contrary forum selection clause), (6) was
in an inconvenient forum, and (7) is not from a country granting reciprocal enforcement
rights. Id. § 36.005(b). The UFCMJRA also provides for stays. Id, § 36.007.
159. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.008 (West 2008); see generally Hilton v.
Guyot, 159. U.S. 113 (1895) (comity as discretionary grounds for recognizing and enforcing
foreign-country judgments).
160. See generally Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2006); Texas Interna-
tional Arbitration Act, TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 172.082(f) (West 2005).
161. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.303 (West 2008).
162. Id. § 159.601.
163. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (2006).
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preclusion and not judgment enforcement. Hoffart v. Wiggins 64 involved
an elderly Texas couple who sued in Oregon and Texas to recover invest-
ment funds allegedly converted by family members. As discussed in the
Choice-Of-Law section, the Hoffarts (1) sued in Texas but voluntarily dis-
missed, (2) then sued in Oregon where they lost both a breach-of-con-
tract claim in jury trial and an Oregon statutory claim on summary
judgment, (3) then sued in federal court in Texas, limiting their claims to
various tort theories along with a federal claim that the court dis-
missed.165 Defendants argued the Oregon judgment precluded the third
lawsuit in Texas. The federal magistrate judge concluded the Texas
claims were not barred because they were raised in Oregon.1 6 6 The fed-
eral district court rejected this part of the federal magistrate judge's rec-
ommendation, ruling instead that the claims were barred. 167 The court
noted that contrary to defendants' brief, Oregon law rather than federal
law, governed the preclusive effect. 168 Oregon uses the transactional test
where final judgment bars relitigation of any claim raised or potentially
joined because it arose from the same transaction. 69 The Hoffarts' tort
claims clearly arose from the same investment setting as their Oregon
claims and were thus barred.170 The court's analysis of the Hoffarts' jury
loss on their contract claim is valid as far as it goes. The opinion fails to
consider, however, the Oregon statutory claim, which the Hoffarts lost on
a summary judgment but reversed on appeal. Thereafter, the Hoffarts
obtained a dismissal of the Oregon claim without prejudice. 171 The re-
cord is unclear as to that claim's further viability in Oregon, but leaves
open the possibility the Oregon statutory claim could be litigated at the
time the Texas action was filed, and with that litigation the Hoffarts could
join related claims. That late joinder is unlikely, but not impossible. At
any rate, the Oregon appellate court's revival of the Oregon statutory
claim may have impaired the Oregon's judgment's finality, thus undoing
preclusion in the Texas federal action.' 72
Two Texas cases routinely enforced sister-state judgments under the
UEFJA, both pointing out that properly filed sister-state judgments are
final in Texas, thus rejecting the defendant's motion for new trial1 73 and
164. No. 1:08-CV-46, 2010 WL 816863 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3), adopting in part, rejecting in
part, No. 1:08-CV-46, 2010 WL 816915 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 30), affd in part, vacated in part, No.
10-40209, 2010 WE 5416802 (5th Cir. Dec. 22, 2010).
165. See supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
166. Hoffart, 2010 WL 816915, at *15.
167. Id. at *4.
168. Id. at *3.
169. Id.
170. Id. at *3-4.
171. Id. at *1 n.2.
172. The court notes finality as an element of preclusion under Oregon law and as-
sumes its existence from the final judgment on the contract claim. Id. at *3. The court
additionally cites an Oregon case on this point, Cogan v. City of Beaverton, but that case
does not address the point here. See 226 Or. App. 381, 203 P.3d 303, 308 (Or. Ct. App.
2009).
173. Counsel Fin. Servs., L.L.C. v. David McQuade Leibowitz, P.C., 311 S.W.3d 45
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 2010, pet. denied).
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various other frivolous challenges. 174
IV. CONCLUSION
Unlike most Survey periods when choice-of-law cases dominate, 2010
is forum contests with five Texas Supreme Court cases favoring foreign
forums over plaintiffs' choice of a Texas forum. Three opinions rested on
derogating forum-selection clauses, that is, clauses designating a foreign
forum that plaintiff defied in choosing to file in Texas. Although it might
be assumed defiant plaintiffs should routinely lose their choice of forum
in such instances, these cases are noteworthy for the court's two holdings
that defendants' dilatory challenges did not waive the clause, and in the
third for the court's expansive reading of an ambiguous clause. Adding
to this, two Texas Supreme Court cases granted forum-non-conveniens
dismissals in favor of foreign forums. While these five opinions may be
nothing more than an adjudication of facts in front of the court, they may
also signal a trend disfavoring a local forum in interstate and interna-
tional disputes. This possibility is underscored by the fact the supreme
court reversed well-reasoned opinions by the courts of appeal in all five
cases.
In addition to this possible doctrinal development presuming against a
Texas forum, the Survey period offered many routine conflicts opinions
demonstrating important fact settings and analyses that will prove valua-
ble to attorneys facing choice-of-law questions. Three noteworthy in-
ternet cases reached different results while applying the test accurately,
with one addressing the internet contact being a third-party payment site.
Well-reasoned choice-of-law opinions demonstrated the corporate affairs
doctrine, bankruptcy choice of law, grounds for disallowing a choice-of-
law clause, inadequate assertion of choice-of-law arguments, and a num-
ber of other valuable tactical points. The foreign judgments category of-
fered one compelling preclusion case instructing accurately on several
points of interstate preclusion and state-federal preclusion.
Collectively, the conflict-of-laws cases in this Survey period illustrate
Texas courts' ongoing judicial skill in difficult doctrines, 175 a general
alignment with national doctrine, and possible exception of the Texas Su-
preme Court's tendency to decline a Texas forum.
174. Diesel Injection Sales and Serv. v. Diesel Heads and Parts Serv., Inc., No. 13-09-289-
CV, 2010 WL 1254605 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Apr. 1, 2010, no pet.).
175. This was not always true. See generally James P. George, Conflicts and Faulty
Analysis: Judicial Misapplication of the Most Significant Relationship Test, 23 REV. LrnG.
489 (2004).
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